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Remarks of Senator Max Baucus
Economic Strategy Institute
March 17, 1993
Thank you all very much. I'm honored to be here, and I thank you for inviting me to
speak today.
I'd like to give special greetings and thanks to the Economic Strategy Institute's
Director, Clyde Prestowitz. One of America's foremost experts on Japan and on trade policy,
Clyde has shown throughout his career the integrity, the commitment and the intellect we
need so badly in policy debates and public service. As you know, he's appeared before my
Subcommittee many times, and today I'm delighted to return the favor.
.I'll begin with a saying that hasn't yet become a cliche, although it should. The US-
Japanese relationship is the most important in the world today, bar none.
You all know that those are Mike Mansfield's words. As he has on so many issues,
he saw it long before the rest of us. And before I begin my formal remarks, I'd like to note
that Mike turned ninety yesterday, and to tell you how proud every Montanan is of him and
( his many years of service to our country. I'm sure you all join me in wishing this good and
wise man a very happy birthday, and many more to come.
THE US-JAPANESE POLITICAL PARTNERSHIP
The US-Japanese partnership Mike Mansfield did so much to build, first as U.S.
Senator and then as our Ambassador to Japan, is approaching a critical time.
For nearly fifty years, the United States and Japan both confronted the threat of the
Soviet Union -- an empire of more than 300 million people, armed with nuclear weapons, a
vast conventional army and a hostile ideology, facing west to Europe and east to the Pacific.
Today that empire is gone, and the Cold War has gone with it. And these events
removed a principal reason for the postwar alliance between the United States and Japan. In
the coming years, we're likely to see a reassessment of that alliance in both countries.
Many Americans are deeply frustrated by the trade deficits we've run with Japan for a
whole generation; by the years of negotiations that have failed to eliminate it; and by Japan's
perceived unwillingness to help pay the cost of world leadership. They wonder whether the
alliance has cost us too much.
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In turn, many Japanese are frustrated by the same failure to make progress on trade;
by the recrimination which comes a year or two after every supposed agreement; and by
American indifference to Japanese views on such critical issues as China policy. They
wonder whether the time has come to seek a new and more independent course in the world.
I believe neither country can afford to give up the alliance. Clyde put it well in his
book Trading Places -- for better or worse, the fates of Japan and the United States will.
always be linked. The question is whether that creates prosperity and contributes to a more
stable and peaceful world; or whether it leads to disputes, conflicts, instability and danger.
CHANGES IN JAPAN
The result of these reassessments are particularly important, since they come at a time
when Japan is beginning to play the global political part its economic leadership makes
inevitable.
In Cambodia, Japanese peacekeepers help make the UN more effective through their
role in the Cambodian peace and elections process.
Japanese development aid has grown to equal our own at approximately $11 billion
per year, and is larger than ours as a proportion of GNP.
The $13 billion in Japanese financial support for the Gulf War coalition, though it got
off to a slow start, was a remarkable and heartening contrast to Japan's token $10 million
contribution to the protection of tankers in the Persian Gulf just three years earlier.
And we find Japanese citizens like Sadako Ogata at the UNHCR, and Yozo Yokata at
the UN's Human Rights Commission, taking a lead in refugee relief and promoting human
rights. This, of course, is not a government policy. But it shows that talented, well-educated
Japanese now view accomplishment in these fields as worth their time and their effort, and
that Japanese people believe that the world's problems are their problem too.
This is an evolutionary process, and still has a ways to go. To mention two areas
where I would like to see more: aid for democracy in Russia and other other former Soviet
republics will not succeed without a Japanese commitment; and the world environmental
crisis requires leadership as strong from Japan as from America and Europe.
All this is to say that trade is not the only aspect of the US-Japan relationship. Our
political ties remain crucial to the whole world. But it is long past time to recognize that no




During the Cold War we tended to view fair trade, and America's economic needs in
general, as separate from and less important than our political and national security agenda.
We made an implicit bargain with Japan: you follow our lead on politics and the military; in
exchange we'll sacrifice our economic interest.
President Clinton says that our security depends more on a strong economy, excellence
in- critical technologies and open markets abroad than raw military power. I agree with him,
and I welcome this vision. But to fulfill it, we must make some big changes -- perhaps
nowhere more than in policy toward Japan.
RECORD OF PAST NEGOTIATIONS
Our past neglect of economic security has done us terrible harm. At the level of
individual industries, it allowed Japanese businesses to not only compete, but to nearly cripple
such critical American industries as autos, consumer electronics, machine tools and
semiconductors. On a larger scale, it let Japan run trade surpluses with us for the past twenty
years, reaching a high of $56 billion in 1987.
Throughout this period, Presidents came and went, saying they were at last going to
take trade with Japan seriously. They held talks in every conceivable forum.
They worked through the GATT. They talked the currency exchange rates up and
down. They tried to stimulate Japanese consumer demand. They argued over individual
industrial sectors. They even tried to change Japan's entire economic and political culture
through the Strategic Impediments Initiative.
Their efforts were not entirely fruitless. Japan's tariffs and other visible barriers to
trade are mostly gone. Some closed sectors opened up. Japan became the largest overseas
market for American agricultural products, and our second largest market for manufactured
goods.
But with the exception of Super 301, none of these talks had the results we hoped for.
And the public is not foolish. They know we're not getting very far. And they're angrier
and more frustrated about it every year.
JAPAN'S TRADE WITH THIRD COUNTRIES
Many, both in America and Japan, point to American failings to explain why the trade
deficit doesn't go away. They argue that American goods aren't the highest quality; that
American businesses don't plan and invest for the long term; that American government runs
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high budget deficits and fails to educate American children as the modern economy requires;
that American citizens consume too much and spend too little.
Some of this is true. Like Ambassador Mansfield says, there are usually two sides to
every issue -- and sometimes the other side is right. We have a great deal to learn from
Japan, in areas like education, promotion of critical technologies and investment. And we've
obviously got to fix our problems, the budget deficit first among them.
Much of it, however, is wrong. The arguments about quality are particularly
troubling, especially since they are so often used as an excuse for closed markets in which
competitive American products like semiconductors and auto parts have no fair chance to
compete. But even if all of it was true, to say that it alone explained the trade deficit would
be to ignore basic facts-about Japanese trade.
Our deficit with Japan peaked at $56 billion in 1987. In that year, we ran a global
trade deficit of $152 billion, which included a $20.6 billion deficit with the EC, an $11.3
billion deficit with Canada and a $34.1 billion deficit with the East Asian NICs.
After 1987, our deficit with Japan marginally declined, then began to rise again. Yet
during the same time, we cut our deficit with Canada by nearly half, cut the deficit with the
NICs by 73%, and begun running a surplus with the EC. Worldwide, our deficit is now $65
billion, two thirds of it with Japan.
Furthermore, much of the fall in our deficit with Japan stems from a shift in Japanese
exports to other markets rather than growing openness to imports.
Today, nearly all developed economies have trade deficit problems with Japan as
serious as ours. The EC runs a consistent $20 billion deficit with Japan, and must run an
array of VRA programs to prevent it from getting even worse. The deficits run by East Asian
NICs have more than doubled from $20 to $52 billion since 1987.
I am happy to concede that some Japanese products are the world's best. But not all.
It is simply impossible to argue that Thai rice, Korean consumer electronics, British banks
and American semiconductor chips and other goods and services from all over the world
could not compete in a fair Japanese market.
THE JAPANESE ECONOMY AND IMPORTS
Studies of the Japanese economy's comparative openness to imports bear this out.
According to the President's Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations, Japan
imports about 5.9% of the manufactured goods its economy consumes. The US, by contrast,
imports 15.3%. Excluding trade within the European Community, imported manufactures
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make up 15.4% of German consumption; 17.7% of British; 13.7% of French; and 12.6% of
Italian consumption.
The experience of American firms in individual Japanese market sectors confirms in
detail what this kind of study finds in general. Highly competitive US goods --
supercomputers, semiconductors, satellites, farm products, even skis and baseball bats --
simply do not find buyers in Japan without intense political pressure from the United States.
The Advisory Committee report thus recommends a big change. It says the time has
come to negotiate on results rather than process. In sectors where invisible barriers block
imports, they advise us to worry about rule and processes later, and to negotiate percentages
of market share for imports now. We should look very seriously at these recommendations;
they are made by leaders of some of America's most successful companies, and they are not
made lightly.
The American Chamber of Commerce in Japan has a similar view of the Japanese
market. Their recent 1993 White Paper cites a barriers to trade in thirty-four specific areas.
These include markets ranging from soda ash to insurance to software, and wider problems
from government procurement policy to distribution systems to patent law. The White
Paper's highly diplomatic evaluation of our progress is this: "The existence of negotiations
and the conclusion of agreements does not mean that problems no longer exist."
These reports are particularly compelling because they include the views of
businesspeople who buy and sell things on the ground, not only economists trying to apply a
theory. It's cattlemen, computer companies, insurance sellers and chemical manufacturers
who see first-hand how it works in the real world -- not simply academics with a model of
how it ought to work.
Japan has eliminated most visible barriers to trade. But informal barriers are still
there. As four generations of American trade negotiators have discovered, they are easy to
name and difficult to change.
-- Preferences for long-term suppliers as opposed to competitive bidding for lowest-
price, best quality products;
-- Economic structures like keiretsu which further complicate the task of foreign
suppliers;
-- A national propensity to save and invest rather than to consume;
-- A widespread view of foreign goods as a threat -- as sinister modern versions of
the four black ships Commander Perry moored in Tokyo Bay so long ago.
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6
These are facts of life in the Japanese economy. They have endured through wild
currency rate swings, stock market booms and busts, economic transformation and
technological revolution.
We may dislike these facts. We may protest against them in one round of negotiation
after another. At times we may well learn from them. But however we react to them, they
are facts of Japanese life.
If we don't approach our trade relations with this in mind, we will continue to fail.
And frustration in both America and Japan will rise, endangering a political partnership that is
essential to the peace and well-being of the whole world.
SII AND SUPER 301
That brings us to the question of what approach we should use to make progress. The
Structural Impediments Initiative expires this July. Although it focuses on some of the right
cultural problems, I am not especially optimistic about its chances for solving them.
Changing an entire nation's way of life is a pretty ambitious goal -- one which can easily lead
to disappointment.
However, I do not rule out SII as part of a larger, more holistic approach to Japan
policy. That can include a number of approaches. Mickey Kantor said at the Finance
Committee last week that we shouldn't "slavishly adhere to one approach" when it comes to
Japan, and I think he's right.
Regardless of the Administration's decision on SII, however, we need negotiations that
work at the level of individual industries trying to sell their products. And if we review the
past twenty years, we'll find that what works is Super 301.
In 1989, using Super 301, we cited Japan's wood product, satellite and supercomputer
markets as unfairly closed to American imports. We made them a priority, and we got
results.
By 1987, eleven years after the marketing of the first supercomputer, Cray and Control
Data had made only one sale to the Japanese government. In 1990 and 1991, with Super 301
in force, American firms won three of nine procurement contracts. American satellite makers
succeed as well. Japan is now the world's largest importer of US wood products. Both
countries prosper, just as free trade theory would predict.
The lesson is if the US government makes trade a priority and backs up its negotiators
with the threat of retaliation, we can make progress. If it stalls, as the American Chamber of
Commerce in Japan reports we may have happened last year in supercomputers, we turn up
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the heat. So I've reintroduced Super 301. I expect Congress to pass it this year, and I expect
the Adiinistration to sign it.
LISTENING TO JAPAN
At the beginning of my remarks today, I noted the implicit bargain we made during
the Cold War. You follow our political lead; in exchange we'll make economic concessions.
That bargain has never been good for us. And after the Cold War, I cannot imagine
that it will survive. I've outlined the trade policy I think should replace it. But I do not want
to close today without giving the other side of the new bargain.
We say we warit. Japan to be a world political leader. I sure do. But as Japan
becomes a world political leader, we must listen much more closely to Japan's views on
political issues. We too rarely understand that Japan lies in a complicated region, and that
Japanese leaders have very difficult questions to answer. Some examples:
-- The Chinese economy is growing at 9% a year. Chinese military spending is
growing at more than 10% a year. And China's political leadership will soon give
way to a new generation with unpredictable views. How should Japan respond?
-- As we've seen this week, radical and isolated North Korea can cause a crisis at any
time. If it does not, we will soon witness the end of the Kim II Sung era, perhaps
followed by Korean national reunification. What will such events mean for already
difficult Korean-Japanese relations?
-- Further north, with growing concern about reform in Moscow, what will be the
future of Russia and its Pacific fleet?
None of these issues are simple. All, and many others, will have a tremendous
influence on Japan's future. American indifference to Japanese views on them can cripple
our alliance.
If this relationship is to work, we have to remember a few things. Japan has national
interests just as we do. They are important and we should respect them. As a friend and an
influential East Asian democracy, Japan has worthwhile advice to give us. We should solicit
that advice and we should.respect it.
When the Japanese Foreign Minister, in his first meeting with our new President, says
isolating China will destabilize Asia, we should take him seriously. When Japanese officials -
- leaders of a democracy, an ally and the second largest economy in the world -- say their




Once again, the United States and Japan have the most important bilateral relationship
in the world, bar none. Mike Mansfield says it all the time -- and he's right every time. We
will continue to have the most important bilateral relationship in the world, whether our
alliance continues or whether frustrations over trade break it up.
The end of the Cold War removes one of the old pillars of our alliance. The risks of
failing to secure that alliance in the post-Cold War era are obvious and grave.
Without the threat the Soviet Union posed to both of us, failure to make progress on
trade will alienate the American public. Failure to listen to Japan's views on questions of
national importance will alienate the Japanese public. Disputes and conflicts will increase,
and over time the US and Japan could become rivals rather than allies. It would be a long,
slow, disastrous process, with terrible consequences for world trade, for the global
environment, for the stability of Asia and for world peace.
It does not have to happen. If we are willing to be both tough and fair about our
economic interests -- if we are open and willing to listen to Japan's political views -- we can
set our partnership on a stronger base than ever before. That will be one of the most difficult
tasks either of our countries faces in the years ahead; and it may well be the most important.
Thank you.
